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We assess the impact of fiscal adjustments (and technology) on the evolution of markups in a panel 
of 14 OECD countries. We allow for smooth changes in the technological parameters by generating 
measures of TFP compatible with markups and assess the interaction between the two variables. 
Our results with narrative action-based data show counter-cyclicality since negative fiscal shocks 
increase markups. Moreover, in times of economic contraction the degree of counter-cyclicality of 
negative (positive) government spending (tax) shocks is larger than during economic expansions. In 
addition, markups have a pro-cyclical behaviour after a productivity shock. However, when 
identifying fiscal consolidations using changes of the cyclically adjusted primary balance, one 
obtains expansionary effects and a pro-cyclical behaviour in terms of markups and aggregate 
demand shocks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The interaction between fiscal policy effectiveness and imperfect competition has received some 
attention in economic theory (Hall, 2009; Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011, and the survey 
by Costa and Dixon, 2011). In particular, the cyclical behaviour of markups following government 
spending shocks has been closely analyzed. The New Keynesian Synthesis has developed models 
that produce undesired endogenous markups due to nominal rigidity, enhancing the effectiveness of 
demand-side policy, including fiscal policy. Moreover, macroeconomic models with time-varying 
desired markups are even more attractive as they work similarly to productivity shocks in the 
presence of active fiscal policy (Ravn et al., 2006). 
The theoretical literature on endogenous markups is dominated by the view that markups behave 
counter-cyclically following a demand shock. When a positive shock originates in the demand side, 
such as a government spending shock, the marginal cost function is only indirectly affected and the 
main effect depends on how the individual demand function responds (see e.g. Gali, 1994a, b; 
Clarida et al. 1999; Goodfriend and King, 1997; Hairault and Portier, 1993; Ravn et al., 2006). 
However, with a positive supply shock (or TFP shock), we expect marginal costs to decrease for a 
given output. Therefore, assuming that the indirect effect on prices via demand is small, markups 
tend to increase implying a pro-cyclical average markup. 
Several papers that try to measure markups for different industries over a period find evidence 
of a mildly counter-cyclical behaviour (Hall, 1988; Martins and Scarpetta, 2002; Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1991, 1999). The combination of demand and supply shocks is a possible explanation 
for the existing evidence on countercyclicality. Recently Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Nekarda and 
Ramey (2010), Juessen and Linnemann (2012) and Afonso and Costa (2013) analyzed the effects of 
fiscal policy on markups’ behaviour both in country-specific VARs and in a panel VAR. 
We contribute to this literature by looking at how fiscal adjustments (i.e. negative spending 
shocks and/or positive tax shocks) affect markups in a panel of 14 OECD countries between 1970 
and 2007. We also allow for smooth changes in the technological parameters by generating 
measures of TFP compatible with markups and then assess the interaction between the two 
variables. The novelty consists in using the narrative action-based approach to identify episodes of 
fiscal consolidation, distinguishing expenditure versus tax-driven adjustments, and how the impacts 
vary depending on the phase of the business cycle (expansions vs. recessions). Moreover, we 





adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as a quantitative approach to identifying fiscal episodes 
(including fiscal expansions), as well as  assessing how the role of other macroeconomic and 
structural factors impact the markup’s cyclicality behaviour.  
Our results show that negative fiscal shocks stemming from fiscal retrenchments (either a 
decrease in expenditure or an increase in taxes) in the fiscal stance lead to a rise in the markup up 
until 4 years after the start of the fiscal episode. Moreover, in times of economic contraction the 
degree of counter-cyclicality of negative (positive) government spending (tax) shocks is much 
larger than in times of economic expansion. 
In addition, markups have a pro-cyclical behaviour after a productivity shock (markups increase 
up to 4 years alongside the positive response of GDP), an outcome consistent with most existing 
endogenous markups hypotheses.  
However, since when using CAPB-based methods one gets evidence of expansionary fiscal 
effects, there is a pro-cyclical behaviour in terms of markups and aggregate demand shocks in that 
case. This result raises some already existing concerns about the use of CAPB-based approaches 
and the need to expand the use of narrative methods.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the framework of 
the markup. Section 3 presents the data and econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE MARKUP  
The markup is the price wedge, 
  (1) 
where  represents the price of the good produced by firm i and  stands for its marginal cost, 
in t.  
Since marginal costs are not observable, one can estimate them using the relationship 
 where  is the nominal wage rate (with homogeneous labour input) and  is 
the marginal product of labor. The production function is represented by Yit = F(Lit,), with 
technology given by  





At being TFP, 0 < t < 1, and t > 0,  and Afonso and Costa (2013) assume that the production 
function has namely a positive decreasing MPLit. 
The data for the markup are from Afonso and Costa (2013).
1
 Therefore, we also used a set of 14 
OECD countries for which there were data on average markups for a long period (1970-2007) and 
the macroeconomic variables were taken from the European Commission AMECO database (see 
Afonso and Costa’s, 2013 notation and definitions below): 
 -  represents real GDP per capita, i.e., per head between 15 and 64 years old, measured in 
2000 PPPs; 
 - stands for real capital stock per capita, measured in 2000 PPPs; 
 - is total hours worked, i.e., the product of average hours per employee and total 
employment, per capita; 
- represents the adjusted wage share in total income, (which was adjusted using the ratio 
between the concepts of employment and number of employees that exist in the national accounts 
for domestic industries), and the long-run labour share is st
*
 = 1 - t. 
 
3. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 Computing fiscal episodes 
The literature addressing the identification of fiscal episodes is vast and has, for a long time, 
relied on changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB). Nevertheless, some caveats 
surrounding this approach have also been highlighted. In particular, the CAPB approach could bias 
empirical estimates towards finding evidence of non-Keynesian effects (see Afonso and Jalles, 
2014). Many non-policy factors, such as price fluctuations, influence the CAPB and can lead to 
erroneous conclusions regarding the presence of fiscal policy changes.
2
 In addition, even when the 
CAPB accurately measures fiscal actions these include discretionary responses to economic 
developments, such as fiscal tightening to restrain rapid domestic demand growth.  
Therefore, with the above mentioned considerations in mind, an alternative “narrative 
approach” is considered, which relies on the identification of fiscal episodes on the basis of concrete 
                                               
1
 This markup data set is available at: https://aquila4.iseg.ulisboa.pt/aquila/homepage/f619/research/datasets/afonso-
and-costa:-market-power-and-fiscal-policy-in-oecd-countries.  
2 For example, a stock price boom raises the CAPB by increasing capital gains tax revenue, and also tends to coincide 





policy decisions. The episodes are identified by looking at IMF and OECD historical reports and by 
checking what countries intended to do at the time of publication.
3
 This policy-action based 
approach makes use of descriptive historical facts that usually describe what happened to the budget 
deficit in a particular period but they do not go into the details of policy makers' intentions, 
discussions and congressional records. Proponents of this approach argue that the estimated size of 
the fiscal measures during the episodes identified have the advantage of not being affected by the 
cycle (since their construction is “bottom-up”), can minimize identification problems,
4
 and are 
unlikely to imply risks of reverse causation (Guajardo and others, 2014). That said, the narrative 
approach could also have some drawbacks: it largely relies on judgment calls, and it may not 
eliminate entirely endogeneity problems (i.e., fiscal policy reacting to the output performance and 
not the other way around). The analysis that follows relies on both the narrative and CAPB-based 
approaches. On the former, the analysis uses the publicly available dataset compiled by Devries and 
others (2011) based on the policy-action based method for advanced economies between 1978 and 
2009. On the latter, we begin in 1970 and
 
the analysis relies on Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1996) 
approach under which a fiscal episode consists of a change in the CAPB at least 5, 4, 3 percentage 
points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year.  
Other approaches used for robustness purposes include: i) Alesina and Ardagna (1998), who 
adopted a fiscal episode definition that allows that some stabilization periods may have only one 
year, that is, they consider the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance that is at 
least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last 
two years; and ii) Afonso’s (2010) under which a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in 
the CAPB (as a percentage of potential GDP) is at least one and a half times the standard deviation 
(from the reference country panel) in one year, or when the change in the CAPB is at least one 
standard deviation on average in the last two years. 
Table 1 reports the fiscal episodes identified according to the above-mentioned four alternative 
methods (table retrieved from Afonso and Jalles, 2014). The number of fiscal contractions ranges 
from 29, in the approach proposed by Afonso (2010), to 43, using the approach from Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998). In the Devries et al.’s (2011) narrative approach the magnitude of the fiscal 
                                               
3 Note, however, that this approach differs from the one used in Romer and Romer (2010), who identify exogenous tax 
policy changes by analyzing US congressional documents. 





consolidation episode ranges between 0.1 percent and about 5 percent of GDP, with an average of 
about 1 percent of GDP. Moreover, it reports a much higher number of years where fiscal 
contractions take place (171 years against an average of 70 for the CAPB approaches). For fiscal 
consolidations, the average duration of the reported fiscal episodes is, on average, 1.7 years for the 
CAPB approaches and around 3.8 years for the narrative approach. Moreover, the three CAPB-
based methods essentially coincide in about 50% of total number of years with those of the 
narrative approach. 
[Table 1] 
3.2 Estimating Impulse Response Functions 
To estimate the impact of fiscal adjustments (and technology) on the evolution of markups 
over the short and medium-run, we follow the method proposed by Jorda (2005) which consists of 
estimating impulse response functions (IRFs) directly from local projections. For each period k the 




with k=1,…,5 (in years) and where Y represents our markup variable;  is a vector that includes 
fiscal consolidations (a dummy taking the value 1 at the beginning of the episode and zero 
otherwise) and technology (proxied by the logarithm of TFP) in country i at time t;  are country 
fixed effects; is a time trend; and  measures the impact of  for each future period k.  
Since fixed effects are included in the regression the dynamic impact should be interpreted as 
compared to a baseline country-specific trend. In the main results, the lag length (l) is set at 2, even 
if the results are extremely robust to different numbers of lags included in the specification (see 
robustness checks and sensitivity presented in the next section). Equation (3) is estimated using the 
panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimator (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
Impulse response functions are obtained by plotting the estimated  for k= 1,…,5, with 
confidence bands computed using the standard deviations of the estimated coefficients . While 





estimation of  and in small samples (Nickell, 1981), the length of the time dimension mitigates 
this concern.5 Robustness checks for endogeneity confirm the validity of the results. 
An alternative way of estimating the dynamic impact of fiscal consolidation episodes (or 
technology) is to estimate an ARDL equation of changes in the markup and consolidation episodes 
(or technology) and to compute the IRFs from the estimated coefficients (Romer and Romer, 1989; 
and Cerra and Saxena, 2008). However, the IRFs derived using this approach tends to be sensitive 
to the choice of the number of lags, making the IRFs potentially unstable. In addition, the 
significance of long-lasting effects with ARDL models can be simply driven by the use of one-type-
of-shock models (Cai and Den Haan, 2009). This is particularly true when the dependent variable is 
highly persistent, as in our analysis. In contrast, the approach used here does not suffer from these 
problems because the coefficients associated with the lags of the change in the dependent variable 
enter only as control variables and are not used to derive the IRFs, and since the structure of the 
equation does not impose permanent effects. Finally, confidence bands associated with the 
estimated IRFs are easily computed using the standard deviations of the estimated coefficients and 
Montecarlo simulations are not required.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Prior to presenting and discussing our main empirical results, one concern when working 
with time-series data is the possibility of spurious correlation between the variables of interest 
(Granger and Newbold, 1974). This situation arises when series are not stationary. We implement 
three different types of panel unit root tests: two first generation tests, namely the Im et al. (2003) 
test (IPS); the Maddala and Wu (1999) test (MW) and one second generation test – the Pesaran 
(2007) CIPS test. The latter is associated with the fact that previous tests do not account for cross-
sectional dependence of the contemporaneous error terms and failure to consider it may cause 
substantial size distortions in panel unit root tests (Pesaran, 2007). Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix show the results for the levels of TFP and the markup and reveal that the null unit root 
hypothesis can be rejected in the latter case but not in the former (first differences of TFP will be 
used). 
                                               





Moreover we employ a recent panel data stationarity test which under the null hypothesis of 
panel stationarity takes multiple structural breaks into account (Carrion-i-Silvestre et al., 2005-CBL 
hereafter)6. The authors developed this instrument for panels including individual fixed effects 
and/or an individual-specific time trend. It also has the capability to consider multiple structural 
breaks positioned at different unknown dates in addition to varying numbers of breaks for each 
individual. This test is of special interest for our purposes because structural breaks do not have to 
be restricted just for the purposes of preventing level shifts. The test of the null hypothesis of a 
stationary panel follows the estimation of the number of structural breaks and their position is based 
on the procedure in Bai and Perron (1998), which computes the overall minimization of the sum of 
the squared residuals.7 Results of the test (which synchronously is a panel and individual data 
stationarity test with multiple structural breaks8) are presented in the Appendix Table A3. We find 
that when we allow for cross-section dependence and when we use the bootstrap critical values, the 
null of stationarity cannot be rejected for the markup at usual levels by either the homogeneous or 
heterogeneous long-run version of the test. The same does not apply for TFP. All in all, evidence 
confirms previous findings, notably for the lack of stationarity of TFP, even after multiple structural 
breaks and cross-section dependence are allowed for.  
The short and medium-term impacts of the fiscal consolidations and TFP on markups are 
shown in Figure 1 for the baseline regression.  Each graph shows the estimated impulse response 
function and the associated one standard error bands (dotted lines), where the horizontal axis 
measures years.  
In general, a negative fiscal shock associated with a fiscal retrenchment in the fiscal stance 
leads to a rise in the markup up until 4 years after the start of the episode. Thus, for the panel as a 
whole markups present a countercyclical behaviour following a decrease in expenditure (or an 
increase in taxes) associated with a consolidation episode, since a negative shock to government 
expenditure decreases GDP (see Figure 1a-a and Figure 1b-d). Hence, results favour endogenous 
                                               
6 We thank Josep Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing his GAUSS code. 
7 We estimate the number of structural breaks associated with each individual using the modified Schwarz information 
criteria. CBL (2005) suggested that in the empirical process, the specified maximum number of structural breaks is 5. 
We compute the finite sample critical values using Monte Carlo simulations with 20,000 replications; in order words, 
we approximate the empirical distribution of the panel data statistic by means of bootstrap techniques to get rid of the 
cross-section independence assumption. 





countercyclical markups for demand shocks (see Hall, 2009): a fiscal adjustment, or similarly 
negative demand shock, implies a shift to the left in the demand curve and a leftward movement 
along the marginal cost curve when output decreases, with a higher increase in prices that the one 
observed in marginal costs.  
On the other hand, markups present a pro-cyclical behaviour after a productivity shock 
(markups increase up to 4 years alongside the positive response of GDP) and this outcome is 
consistent with most existing endogenous markups hypotheses, either of the undesired or of the 
desired kinds (see Figure 1a-b and Figure 1b-e).  
 
Figure 1.a Baseline (PCSE): Response of Markups to Fiscal Consolidations, TFP and GDP shocks 
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Figure 1.b Baseline (PCSE): Response of GDP to Fiscal Consolidations, TFP and Markup shocks 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. See main text for more details. Horizontal axis indicates years after the shock. PCSE - 
panel-corrected standard error. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
In order to check the robustness of the results, Equation (2) is re-estimated by including time 
fixed effects to control for specific time shocks, as those affecting world interest rates. The results 





broadly unchanged. Moreover, as shown by Tuelings and Zubanov (2010), a possible bias from 
estimating Equation (3) using country-fixed effects is that the error term of the equation may have a 
non-zero expected value, due to the interaction of fixed effects and country-specific fiscal 
developments. This would lead to a bias of the estimates that is a function of k. to address this issue 
and check the robustness of our findings, Equation (3) was re-estimated by excluding country fixed 
effects from the analysis. The results (not shown but available upon request) suggest that this bias is 
negligible (the difference in the point estimate is small and not statistically significant). As an 
additional sensitivity check, Equation (3) was re-estimated for different lags (l) of changes in the 
markup. The results for zero lags and three lags (not shown but available upon request) confirm that 
previous findings are not sensitive to the choice of the number of lags. Moreover, using alternative 
markups and the corresponding TFP measures provided similar results. 
Furthermore, estimates of the impact of fiscal consolidations (or technology) on markups 
could be biased because of endogeneity, as unobserved factors influencing the dynamics of public 
finances may also affect the probability of the occurrence of a consolidation episode. In particular, a 
significant deterioriation in economic activity, which would affect unemployment, may determine 
an increase in the public debt ratio via automatic stabilizers, and therefore increase the probability 
of consolidation. To address this issue, Equation (3) was augmented to control for the output gap 
(computed by means of the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 applied to real GDP). The 
results of this exercise (not shown but available upon request) confirm the robustness of the 
previous findings.  
 
Figure 2. Robustness (GMM): Response of Markups to Fiscal Consolidations and TFP shocks 
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Moreover, an alternative way to deal with endogeneity concerns is to re-estimate Equation 
(3) by means of a GMM estimator such as the Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator is 
particularly relevant when series are very persistent and the lagged levels may be weak instruments 
in the first differences. In this case, lagged values of the first differences can be used as valid 
instruments in the equation in levels and efficiency is increased by regressing Equation (3) with the 
use of a system GMM estimator.9  Figure 2 shows the results and confirms the findings discussed 
above. Finally, using alternative measures of markups (see Afonso and Costa, 2013) – not shown – 
 does not qualitatively alter our main conclusions. 
 
4.3 Alternative definitions of fiscal consolidations 
So far we have based our results on the use of the Devries et al. (2011) narrative approach 
dataset. We also use now the method of identifying fiscal episodes using changes in the CAPB. 
Taking the three alternative approaches detailed in Section 3 and re-estimating Equation (3) for 
Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1996), Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) and Afonso’s (2010) alternative 
approaches to identify fiscal episodes, gives the IRFs displayed in Figure 3. In general, we still find 
that fiscal consolidations lead to an increase in markups  
However, and as illustrated elsewhere (see e.g. Afonso and Jalles, 2014) the use of CAPB-
based methods to identify fiscal consolidation episodes can result in expansionary effects on output. 
This is exactly what we observe in Panel B where a fiscal consolidation episode delivers an 
expansionary fiscal consolidation result. Therefore, when using the CAPB as a measure of the fiscal 
episodes, we have, in this case, a pro-cyclical behaviour in terms of markups and aggregate demand 
shocks. This section’s result highlights the concerns about the use of CAPB-based approaches and 





                                               
9 The list of instruments includes the first and second lags of all the right-hand-side variables. The null of Hansen J-test 
for overidentifying restrictions is not rejected, meaning that the model specification is correct and all overidentified 
instruments are exogenous. The tests for serial correlation also point to the absence of second-order serial correlation in 





Figure 3. CAPB-based Approaches (PCSE)  
 
Panel A: Response of Markups to Fiscal Consolidations 
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Panel B: Response of GDP to Fiscal Consolidations 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. See main text for more details. Horizontal axis indicates years after the shock. 
 
4.4 Composition of Fiscal Consolidation 
Does the composition of fiscal consolidation (expenditure versus taxes-driven) matter for 
markups’ dynamics? In order to test this hypothesis, Equation (3) is separately estimated for taxes 
and spending-based adjustments, by constructing starting dummies of taxes and spending 
consolidation episodes (in the Devries et al. (2011) dataset the average magnitude of both spending 
and taxes-based consolidation is about 1 percent of GDP). The results presented in Figure 4, top 
panel, show that spending consolidation programs have a more counter-cyclical effect over the short 
and medium term than tax-based ones. This is confirmed by looking at the bottom panel that 







Figure 4. Expenditure vs. Tax-Based Adjustments (PCSE)  
Panel A: Response of Markups to Fiscal Consolidations 
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Panel B: Response of GDP to Fiscal Consolidations 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. See main text for more details. Horizontal axis indicates years after the shock. 
 
This result however has to be treated with caution given that most of past fiscal adjustments 
have involved both spending cuts and tax increases. In order to address this issue, following 
Guajardo et al. (2014), Equation (3) is separately estimated for: i) episodes where taxes-based 
adjustments have been larger than spending adjustments; 2) episodes where spending adjustments 
have been larger than tax based adjustments. These correspond to the “alternative definition” of tax 





upon request) confirm that spending-based consolidations tend to have larger (positive) impact on 
markups.10 
 
4.5 The role of the Business Cycle Phase: Good times vs. Bad times 
In order to explore whether cyclicality varies depending on the phase of the business cycle, 
the following alternative regression will be estimated: 
 (4) 
with  
where z is an indicator of the state of the economy (using the output gap) normalized to have zero 
mean and unit variance.
11
 The remainder of the variables and coefficients are defined as in Equation 
(3). 
 Still with the narrative-action based dataset, in times of economic contraction the degree of 
counter-cyclicality of negative (positive) government spending (tax) shocks is much larger than in 
times of economic expansion (Figure 5). In fact, during booms, the response of markups to a fiscal 
adjustment is pro-cyclical. This remains true even when one splits between expenditure and tax-
based consolidations. One can admit that the size of the fiscal multiplier would tend to be lower on 
the spending side. For instance, a reduction in public wages can have a demonstration effect to 
private wages allowing for higher firm profits, more private investment, and the overall effect on 
GPD would be more mitigated than via the tax based fiscal consolidation.  
                                               
10 It must be recognized that also this approach is imperfect. Indeed, to properly differentiate between spending versus 
tax-based consolidations one should consider episodes characterized by only spending or taxes-based adjustments. This 
however would dramatically reduce the number of “pure” spending and taxes-based consolidations in our sample. 
11 This approach is equivalent to the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model developed by Granger and 
Teravistra (1993). The main advantage of this approach relative to estimating SVARs for each regime is that it 
considers a larger number of observations to compute the impulse response functions, thus making the responses more 





Figure 5. The role of the Business Cycle Phase: a shock to fiscal consolidations (PCSE) 
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Panel A: Impulse of Overall Consolidations 
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Panel B: Impulse of Expenditure based Consolidations 
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Panel C: Impulse of Tax based Consolidations 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. See main text for more details. Horizontal axis indicates years after the shock. 
 
 In the case of positive technology shocks, in times of expansions markups are pro-cyclical 






















Figure 6. The role of the Business Cycle Phase: a shock to TFP (PCSE)  
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. See main text for more details. 
 
4.6 The role of structural factors 
We now assess whether the effect of fiscal consolidation and productivity shocks on the 
behaviour of markups depends on countries’ structural, macroeconomic and policy variables: 
indebtedness (debt-to-GDP ratio), country size (population), trade openness (exports plus imports 
over GDP), level of economic development (real GDP per capita) and institutional settings (political 
constraints). 
To test whether the factors mentioned above affect the response of markups to negative fiscal 
shocks and positive TFP shocks, Equation (3) is re-estimated  using these variables’ 2
nd
 quartile as 
the threshold value to split the whole sample into two sub-samples that will be compared against the 
baseline. 
Looking at Figure 7.1 one observes that the countercyclical response of markups following a 
negative fiscal shock is larger in the short-run in countries with lower debt-to-GDP ratios or smaller 





Moreover, the positive impact of a TFP shock on the markups’ behaviour is larger in bigger 
countries.  
 
Figure 7.1 The role of Structural Factors (PCSE): Response of Markups to Fiscal Consolidations 
and TFP shocks 
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Note: Lines represent the impulse responses of markups to fiscal consolidation and TFP shocks (panels a) and b) respectively). Blue line denotes the 
baseline (full) sample result; the dotted green and dotted red lines denote the corresponding groups as identified in the legends when they are 
statistically significantly different from zero (otherwise they are equal to the baseline). The threshold point for each structural factor considered 
corresponds to the 2
nd
 quartile (above/below). See main text for more details. Horizontal axis indicates years after the shock. 
 
In Figure 7.2 results show that countries more open to international trade and with larger 
GDP per capita display a higher degree of markups’ countercyclicality following a negative fiscal 
shock. Furthermore, positive TFP shocks have a greater impact the lower the development level, 
translating the larger marginal returns to factors of production associated with countries further 










Figure 7.2 The role of Policy and Macro Factors (PCSE): Response of Markups to Fiscal 
Consolidations and TFP shocks 
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Note: vide footnote figure 8.1 
 
The literature on fiscal policy has generally pointed out that a key factor in explaining 
differences across countries in the conduct of fiscal policy is the quality of political institutions. The 
results suggest that countries characterized by a lower quality of institutions generally tend to be 
characterized by worse fiscal outcomes in terms of debt levels, government size, spending volatility 
and cyclicality of fiscal deficits (Persson, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2001; Alesina et al., 2008). 
In Figure 7.3 we get the result that in countries with higher political constraints the degree of 
markups’ countercyclicality following a negative fiscal shock is larger while the degree of 














Figure 7.3 The role of Institutions (PCSE): Response of Markups to Fiscal Consolidations and TFP 
shocks 
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Note: vide footnote figure 8.1 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We assess the impact of fiscal adjustments and TFP shocks on the evolution of average 
markups in a panel of 14 OECD countries for a long period between 1970 and 2007. We use 
alternative approaches to identify fiscal consolidations (cyclically adjusted primary balance and 
narrative action-based) and allow for smooth changes in the technological parameters by generating 
measures of TFP compatible with markups to assess the interaction between the two variables. 
Econometrically, we resort to impulse response analysis estimated directly from local projections. 
Using the narrative-action based approach we find that a negative fiscal shock associated with 
a fiscal retrenchment (either a decrease in expenditure or an increase in taxes) in the fiscal stance 
leads to a rise in the markup up until 4 years after the start of the episode: a countercyclical result. 
On the other hand, markups present a pro-cyclical behaviour after a productivity shock (markups 
increase up to 4 years alongside the positive response of GDP) and this outcome is consistent with 
most existing endogenous markups hypotheses. Our main results are robust to several sensitivity 
checks such as the inclusion of time fixed effects, the exclusion of country fixed effects, alternative 
lag specifications, different definitions of markups, augmented set of controls and alternative 
estimators. 
Nevertheless, the use of CAPB-based methods to identify fiscal consolidation episodes 
provides expansionary effects results, with a fiscal consolidation episode delivering more growth. 
Therefore, when using the CAPB as a measure of the fiscal episodes, we find a pro-cyclical 





Additional empirical exercises reveal that spending-based consolidation programs have a more 
counter-cyclical effect on the behaviour of markups over the short and medium term than tax-based 
ones. Moreover, in times of economic contraction the degree of counter-cyclicality of negative 
(positive) government spending (tax) shocks is much larger than in times of economic expansion. 
Results also seem to support some symmetry in the results, in the sense that the short-term impact 
of fiscal expansions on markups is negative, therefore corroborating the counter-cyclicality. Finally, 
we uncovered that the role of structural, macroeconomic and policy variables does matter, 
particularly in the short-term. 
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Table 1: Fiscal contraction episodes based on the change in the primary cyclically adjusted 
budget balance and on the narrative approach 
 
Country Devries et al. (2011)  Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996) 
 Alesina and Ardagna (1998)  Afonso (2010) 
Australia 1985-88, 1994-99  1987-88  1987-88  1987-88 
Austria 1980-81, 1984, 1996-97, 
2001-02 
 1997  1984, 1997, 2001, 2005  1984, 1997, 2001, 2005 
Belgium 1982-87, 1990-97  1982-87  1982-85, 1993, 2006  1982-85 
Canada 1984-97  1987, 1996-98  1981, 1986-87, 1996-97  1987, 1996-97 
Denmark 1983-86, 1995  1983-87  1983-86  1983-86 
Finland 1992-97  1976-77, 1997-98, 2000-01  1976-77, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1996-97, 
2000-01 
 1976-77, 1996-97, 2000-01 
France 1987-92, 1995-2000       
Germany 1982-84, 1991-2000, 2003-
07 
      
Ireland 1982-88, 2009  1976-77, 1983-86, 1988-89, 
2010 
 1976-77, 1983-84, 1988, 2010  1976-77, 1983-84, 1988, 
2010 
Italy 1991-98, 2004-2007  1977, 1982-83, 1992-94  1977, 1982-83, 1992-93  1977, 1982-83, 1992-93 
Japan 1980-83, 1997-98, 2003-07  1998-2000, 2005-07  1998-99, 2005-06  1999-00, 2006-07 
Netherlands 1981-88, 1991-93, 2004-05  1991, 1993  1991, 1993  1991 
Portugal 1983, 2000-07  1977, 1983-84, 1986  1977, 1983-84, 1986, 1988, 1992, 
1995,2006 
 1977, 1983-84, 1986, 1988, 
1992 
Spain 1983-84, 1989-97  1987  1986, 1987, 2010  1987 
Sweden 1984, 1993-98  1984, 1987, 1996-99  1976, 1983-84, 1987, 1996-97  1984, 1987, 1996-97 
United Kingdom 1980-82, 1994-99  1981-82, 1997-2000  1981, 1997-98, 2000  1981, 1997-98 
United States 1980-81, 1985-98       
Years with episodes 171  73  79  59 
Average duration 
(years) 
3.8  2.1  1.5  1.6 








Table A1: First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Panel Unit Root Test (IPS) (a) 
Full markup  TFP  
in levels     
 lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] 
 1.14 -11.258** 1.43 0.918 
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) Panel Unit Root Test (MW) (b) 




in levels     
0 120.806 0.00 3.243 1.00 
1 207.140 0.00 17.261 0.94 
2 142.865 0.00 19.82 0.87 
3 129.492 0.00 21.21 0.81 
Notes: (a) We report the average of the country-specific “ideal” lag-augmentation (via AIC). We report the t-bar statistic, constructed as 
 ii tNbart )/1( ( it are country ADF t-statistics). Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic has a non-
standard distribution: the critical values are -1.73 for 5%, -1.69 for 10% significance level – distribution is approximately t. We indicate the cases 
where the null is rejected with **. (b) We report the MW statistic constructed as  )log(2 ii pp ( ip are country ADF statistic p-values) for 
different lag-augmentations. Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic is distributed )2(2 N . We further 
report the p-values for each of the MW tests.  
 
Table A2: Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS) 




in levels     
0 -6.416 0.00 6.945 1.00 
1 -8.080 0.00 -0.115 0.45 
2 -6.503 0.00 -1.758 0.04 
3 -4.895 0.00 -2.818 0.00 
Notes: Null hypothesis of non-stationarity. We further report the p-values for each of the CIPS tests. 
 
Table A3: CBL (2005) Panel Unit Root Tests allowing for multiple breaks 
Variable markup 
KPSS test Test statistics Bootstrap critical values 
  90% 95% 97.5% 99% 
Homogeneity -3.689 2.093 3.007 3.951 5.129 
Heterogeneity -2.681 2.010 2.696 3.586 4.444 
Variable TFP 
KPSS test Test statistics Bootstrap critical values 
  90% 95% 97.5% 99% 
Homogeneity 3.582** 2.506 3.386 4.515 5.397 
Heterogeneity 2.947* 2.252 2.952 3.509 4.425 
Notes: The number of break points for each individual country (not shown for reasons of parsimony) is estimated using the modified Schwarz 
information criteria allowing for a maximum of 5 structural breaks. The long-run variance is estimated using the Barlett kernel with automatic spectral 
window bandwidth selection. We present both the case where disturbances are assumed to be heteroscedastic across the cross-sectional dimension as 
well as the test statistic which assumes homogeneous long-run variance. All bootstrap critical values allow for cross-sectional dependence. The null 
hypothesis is of panel stationarity.     
